Antitrust Philosophy of the Common Market - Restraint or Prohibition by Rishe, Melvin
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 17 
Issue 1 Fall 1967 Article 6 
Antitrust Philosophy of the Common Market - Restraint or 
Prohibition 
Melvin Rishe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Melvin Rishe, Antitrust Philosophy of the Common Market - Restraint or Prohibition, 17 DePaul L. Rev. 144 
(1967) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol17/iss1/6 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
COMMENTS
ANTITRUST PHILOSOPHY OF THE COMMON MARKET-
RESTRAINT OR PROHIBITION
History testifies to the futility of force in achieving peace among nations;
nevertheless, in each century this means has been employed in the quest for
freedom, unity and peace. And although the alleged enemy is conquered and
his territory incorporated, the origins of distrust and unrest continue to make
political unity and harmony impossible. One step toward achieving these
goals is economic unity and stability. Without these fundamental conditions
peace cannot be realized. Today, there are numerous movements in existence
whose aim is to unite various nations economically. These movements, how-
ever, are limited in scope and influence and often oppose each other as each
zealously tries to strengthen its own position. They have, in effect, created
clans of nations. Nevertheless, if they can achieve internal economic stability,
they will have laid the cornerstone for an international alliance for peace.
Among these movements is the European Economic Community (EEC),
usually referred to as the Common Market. Its name is, in itself, somewhat
of a misnomer, for it is merely an association of six European nations: Bel-
gium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxemberg and the Netherlands. Estab-
lished by the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the avowed purpose of the Community is:
•.. in accordance with the time-table envisaged in this Treaty:
(a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of quanti-
tative restrictions in regard to the import and export of goods . . . ;
(b) the establishment of a common custom tariff and of a common commercial
policy towards third countries;
(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement
of persons, services and capital;
(d) the inauguration of a common policy in the field of agriculture;
(e) the inauguration of a common policy in the field of transport; [and]
(f) the establishment of a system ensuring that competition in the Common
Market is not distorted .... 1
This comment will be concerned with only one aspect of the Treaty,
namely, its antitrust provisions, their basis, effect and application. 2 This may
1 Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome (1957) translated in LANG, THE COMMON MARKET
AND COMMON LAW 501 (1966).
2 The specific prohibitions against monopolistic activities are set forth in articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty of Rome. Though there are indications of antimonopoly policies in
other provisions of the Treaty, these two articles are the only ones which specify guide-
lines by which the European Economic Community Commission may regulate monopo-
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be considered the second stage of the Common Market scheme. Primarily, the
EEC was established to remove "the obstacles to the free movement of per-
sons, services and capital,"3 so that each member nation may thrive. How-
ever, cognizant of the results of free competition, the EEC included two
articles, 85 and 86, to counter the abuses often resulting from a competitive
system.4 In order to fully understand the philosophy of the framers of these
articles, it will be advantageous to compare and contrast them to antitrust
legislation in the United States.
Many authors contend that the Common Market antitrust provisions are
offshoots of the United States' experience in this field, which formally began
with passage of the Sherman Act in 1890. Undoubtedly there is some validity
to this contention, for the United States has evolved the most sophisticated
antitrust legislation of all nations and it is likely that a legislative designer
would look to the leader in the field in formulating an antitrust policy. How-
ever, though "the language of the Articles . . . is couched in somewhat
similar broad terms to that in the Sherman Act," 5 the similarity is superficial
for the concepts of the founders of the respective provisions differ. While
United States anti-monopoly philosophy is dogmatic, rigid and absolute in
its prohibitions, "the Treaty provisions on restrictive practices . . . are not
the result of strong views on free competition or a political objection to
monopoly power," 6 but rather the outgrowth of the prevalent view that eco-
nomic stability could not be achieved without some regulation of competi-
tion. "The architects of the Common Market seized upon the logical principle
that . . . an active anti-monopoly policy is indispensable in order to prevent
private restrictive agreements from negating the effects of the lowering of
trade barriers by the member countries."'7
Yet, to attribute the prohibitions of articles 85 and 86 to logic alone would
be erroneous, for the Common Market countries have historically regulated
restrictive trade practices. As early as 1810, France had enacted a provision
penalizing restrictive trade practices.8 Penalties were imposed wherever,
listic activities between its member states. It should be noted that these provisions, as
well as all others in the Treaty, refer to activities between member states. They do not
purport to regulate any activity which takes place solely within one of the states.
SLANG, supra note 1, at 501.
4 See Linssen, The Application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, in THIE ANTITRUST
STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMM-ON MARKET 30 (1962).
5 Fugate, The Activities of the Department of Justice in the Field of Foreign ,Com-
merce, in THE ANTITRUST STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET 2 (1962).
6 LANG, supra note 1, at 378.
7 Fugate, supra note 5, at 3.
8 Goetz-Giery, Monopoly and Competition in France, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION
AND THEIR REGULATION 35 (1954).
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the object [was] to raise or lower prices above or below the levels which would
have prevailed under conditions of free and natural competition; and [when]
the means to that object took the form of an amalgamation or coalition of the
principal dealers of the product concerned. 9
It was not until 1926 that this French provision was modified to penalize
only those operations which were intended to secure monopolistic profits.'0
In another Common Market country, Italy, "the history of restrictive
practices . . . may be said to reach back to the fifteenth century, when
an agreement was reached in the Concordat of June 11, 1470, between Pope
Paul II and King Ferdinand of Naples restricting the price of alum."" And
in Germany, "Frederick the Great promulgated, between 1766 and 1772, a
series of measures bringing all branches of the mining industry under the
most rigorous state control."'1 2 Nonetheless, in contrast to these examples of
anti-monopoly regulations, European history also "abounds with examples
of local, national and international cartels."'1 - In fact, "the birthplace of the
modern cartel was [in] Germany,"' 4 where they were created by the state
primarily for revenue. 15 Thus, the Common Market has a dual tradition;
one which denounces monopolies which are prone to adversely affect the
economy and one which encourages monopolies which can be beneficial to
the economy.
This tradition clearly differs from United States tradition where monopolies
and cartels have been considered inherently contrary to the spirit of free
competition.' 6 As stated by one authority, "the basic principal of anti-
9 id.
10 Id.
11 Torre, Italian Antitrust Law, 14 Am. J. ComP. L. 489, 491 (1965). See also Vito,
Monopoly and Competition in Italy, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION AND THEIR REGU-
LATION 52 (1954): "Government action in relation to competition and monopoly in Italy
is not necessarily directed towards protecting competition and curbing monopoly. It is
rather based on the principle that in certain cases limitation of competition is necessary
in the interest of all the parties concerned and of the economy as a whole. It should not
be forgotten that Italy is included among those countries which, as early as the begin-
ning of the century, resorted to compulsory cartels."
12 STOCKING & WATKINS, CARTELS OR COMPETITION 24 (1948). See also Boehm, Monop-
oly and Competition in West Germany, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETTrION AND THEIR
REGULATION 152 (1954): "Economic freedom means in Germany the freedom of business-
men to choose between competition and monopoly."
Is JENSEN & WALTER, THE COMION MARKET-EcoNoMIC INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 132
(1964).
14 STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 12, at 23.
15 STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 12, at 23.
16 STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 12, at 3. A cartel is defined therein as an arrange-
ment among, or on behalf of, producers engaged in the same line of business, with the
design or effect of limiting or eliminating competition among them.
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monopoly is that Congress did not condone 'good trusts' and 'condemn bad
ones,' it forbade all."1 7 This absolutist position, however, is erroneous in its
extreme, for while United States legislation has imposed stringent restrictions
on monopolistic activities which may infringe upon the hallowed ideas of free
competition,'8 it is equally true that "Congress has not thought it appropri-
ate that there should be free competition in the field of utilities."' 9 By legis-
lating monopoly in this field, there is inconsistency. Despite this, in those
areas in which free competition has been deemed of the essence, Congress has
enacted absolute prohibitions against courses of conduct which demonstrate
an attempt to monopolize.2
0
Thus, it is evident that American and European monopoly traditions vary.
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, enunciating the Common Market's basic
antitrust policy, can only be interpreted in light of the traditions of its
framers. This same provision, if interpreted in the United States' tradition
would undoubtedly have a different meaning. The article provides that:
[T]he following practices [are] incompatible with the Common Market: all
agreements between undertakings, all decisions by associations of undertakings
and all concerted practices which are liable to affect trade between Member
States and which are designed to prevent, restrict or distort competition within
the Common Market or which have this effect. This shall, in particular, include:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other
trading conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development or
investment;
(c) market sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application of unequal conditions to parties undertaking equivalent
engagements in commercial transactions, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage .... 21
Because of these restrictions, it has been stated that "the Treaty of Rome
establishing the EEC . . . carefully avoided to leave any opportunity [for]
trusts to be formed."122 However, it is more likely that the concern was not
17 Heflebower, Monopoly and Competition in the United States, in MONOPOLY AND
COMPETITION AND THEIR REGULATION 129 (1954). This phrase, which has since become a
cliche in American antitrust law, was originally pronounced by the eminent Judge
Learned Hand.
18 Beausang, The Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, 70 DICK. L. REv.
187 (1966). "Certainly, a national antitrust policy exists. In overall substance it demands
the maintenance of a competitive business society, free from unreasonable restraints of
trade or commerce." Id. at 197.
19 NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 7 (1962).
2 0 Id. at 469.
21 LANG, supra note 1, at 504.
22 Bassiouni, The Common Market's First Major Anti-trust Decision and the Free Flow
of Commerce, July-Aug. 1965 The Bulletin 14. See also WASSERMAN, HUFFMAN & MOORE,
THE COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN BUSINESS (1964).
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so much to prevent the formation of trusts per se, as it was to prevent re-
strictive market practices which might result from trusts.23 A trust may in
fact serve a useful purpose, and if so the article itself exempts such trusts
from its prohibitions. Subsection three of the article provides that:
[A]ny agreement ...between undertakings, any decision ...by associations of
undertakings, and any concerted practice or type of concerted practice which helps
to improve the production or distribution of goods or to promote technical or
economic progress, [while] allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting profit
and which does not:
(a) subject the concerns in question to any restrictions which are not indis-
pensable to the achievement of the above objectives;
(b) enable such concerns to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial
part of the goods concerned.24
Article 85 does not create an impregnable wall of restrictions on monopo-
listic activities. Rather, it seeks to insulate the public from harm. Therefore,
it is not necessary that there be an intent or a conscious effort to restrict com-
petition, there need be only the objective fact of the limitation. The Treaty
does not speak of "restraint of trade" as does the Sherman Act; instead, it
speaks of preventing restricting or distorting competition to the detriment of
the public.25 In addition, to further protect the public from the deleterious
effects of monopolies, 26 article 86 of the Treaty provides that "any improper
exploitation . .. of a dominant position . .. shall be deemed to be incom-
patible with the Common Market .... -27 It is conceded that dominant
positions will exist in any competitive market.28 The provision restricts using
23 But see, Political and Economic Planning, CARTEL POLICY AND THE COMMON MARKET
(Forsyth ed. 1962). "The Common Market's present provisions for restrictive trade
practices are based on the following principles: restrictive agreements are forbidden a
priori, with the exceptions to this rule narrowly limited; dominant positions are forbidden
a priori from misusing their power; there are no provisions for action against mergers,
but the Commission is given fairly wide powers to investigate sectors of the market,
should it consider that this is necessary." Id. at 278.
24 LANG, supra note I, at 504.
25 Minoli, Industry's View of Trade Regulation in the European Economic Community,
in THE ANTITRUST STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET 46, 49 (1962).
26 Supra note 23, at 260: "(T]o fall within the scope of Article 85, an agreement must
have the object or effect of preventing, restraining or distorting competition within the
Common Market. This means that the intention to restrain competition is as important
as any actual restraint on competition in judging an agreement."
27 LANG, supra note 1, at 505.
28 Thompson, The European Economic Community After the 1965 Crisis, 16 INT'L
AND COuP. L.Q. 1 (1967). "Article 85 prohibits agreements, and if there is no agreement
or concerted practice, there is nothing to be struck down by article 85. The matter would
instead have to come within article 86, dealing with the abuse of a dominant position."
Id. at 27.
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such positions for improper exploitation. Again it is evident that a monopoly
which does not abuse the public is not in violation of the Treaty.
Hence, a fundamental distinction exists between United States and Com-
mon Market antitrust philosophy. The difference lies not so much in what is
being restricted, but in why there is a need to restrict. Though this distinc-
tion is theoretical in nature, it should cause court decisions in the respective
systems to vary. Whereas a United States court must look solely at the facts
in a given case, the EEC Commission must look solely to the effects; and
while the former need only determine that a monopoly exists for public policy
to be violated, the latter must determine that the public has been harmed by
the existence of a monopoly.29
Though philosophical differences exist, it is "widely conceded that the
United States is pre-eminent in the power and drive of her industry and
commerce." 30 Whether or not this is because of or in spite of its antitrust
policies is a question which has been pondered since the inception of Ameri-
can antitrust laws. Nevertheless, the Common Market approach, distinguish-
ing that which is beneficial to a free and thriving economy and that which
is detrimental, would seem to be more logical than an approach which opposes
a priori any combination or agreement amounting to a monopoly regardless
of its possible beneficial effects.
One need not ponder why there exists such a divergence in antitrust philos-
ophy. The Common Market's dual tradition has restricted activities which
adversely affect the market but has encouraged cartels which benefit the
economy.3 ' On the other hand, the United States tradition is one which has
denounced bigness as detrimental to a free market economy. United States
antitrust laws owe their "origin largely to political pressures of an agrarian
and radical flavour; and there is little doubt that in more recent times anti-
trust has been an outlet for powerful currents of 'anti-big-business' radical-
ism growing out of the years of depression."3 2 Although it is inevitable that
in an expanding economy one faction will gain an economic advantage over
29 Conrad, Corporate Fusion in the Common Market, 14 Am. J. CoMP. L. 598 (1966),
wherein the author expresses the view that "the Treaty of Rome does not make any
combination of companies illegal, and that illegality can come only when a monopolistic
combination abuses its powers .... "
80 NEALE, supra note 19, at 1.
31 Comment, Emergence of Group Exemptions within the EEC Policy on Competition,
6 VA. J. INT'L L. 128 (1965). "Monopolies and cartels have traditionally been a very
essential instrument in economic progress, and have been looked on as having beneficial
effects which in fact must be carefully balanced against possible detrimental effects. This
is in sharp contrast with American antitrust law, as embodied principally in the Sherman
and Clayton Antitrust Acts, which control activities restraining interstate commerce, re-
gardless of any economic benefit resulting from such activities." Id. at 129.
32 NEALE, supra note 19, at 419. "Agricultural marketing over a wide range of products
is also substantially insulated from the antitrust law." Id. at 7.
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another, the American public has been trained to be suspicious of the "Big"
and to demand government control and restraint. This is done ostensibly to
preserve the small businessman, the cornerstone on which the American sys-
tem of free enterprise is supposed to rest. In reality, this pivotal group is
slowly diminishing in number and is being replaced by the tremendous work-
ing force of the large corporations. The public, however, is not fully cognizant
of these changes because it is still being educated in an antitrust philosophy
which does not view the American scene as it is but as it was a century ago.
Business may only expand within the limits of this prevalent philosophy,
and whether or not such expansion is beneficial to society is not as important
as the maintenance of arbitrary boundaries on business growth. 33
To what extent the philosophical difference in the Common Market ap-
proach will affect practical application is not yet fully known. While the
United States courts have ostensibly upheld its philosophy in litigation in
the field for over seventy years, the Common Market's code is relatively
young and has yet to be seriously challenged. Some insight, however, can be
gained from the Grundig case,34 which was the first major antitrust contro-
versy decided by the EEC. This unique case afforded the Commission the
opportunity to clearly enunciate its antitrust policy.
The Grundig Company of Germany had appointed the French company,
Consten, to be its exclusive distributor in France. Grundig agreed not to sell
to anyone else in France and to impose the same restriction on its dealers.
In return, Consten agreed not to sell outside of France. Grundig also trans-
ferred to Consten its trademark, Gint, so that it could be registered by them
in France. Subsequently, UNEF, a competitor of Consten, agreed with an-
other German company to buy Grundig products and market them in France
at a lower price than Consten. An action was originally instituted by Grundig
and Consten in a French court to enjoin UNEF from selling Grundig prod-
ucts in France and from violating its trademark rights. While the lower
French court found for Consten, the French Court of Appeals subsequently
reversed the decision because the matter was being considered by the EEC
Commission. At the Commission proceedings it was held that the Grundig-
Consten agreement imposed an undue restriction on intra-brand competition
in violation of the Treaty of Rome. The agreement was thus held null and
void. Basically, the Commission used the fairness to the consumer test to
33 While this anti-big-business philosophy is reflected in United States legislation, in
fact, the line between what is technically a monopoly and what is not is very thin. For
example, General Motors, which is said to have a budget larger than all but four coun-
tries in the world, is not deemed a monopoly. Surely, the pioneers of antitrust legislation
in the United States never envisioned a company of such magnitude, much less that such
a company would not be deemed a monopoly.
34 161 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DES COMMUNAUTE'S EUROPAENNES 2545 (1964).
[Vol. XVII
COMMENTS
arrive at this decision.35 Since the consumer was not benefited, i.e. the UNEF
price to the consumer was, in fact, lower than the Consten price, the restric-
tive agreement was held to affect the market adversely and therefore was in
violation of article 85. One authority has noted that the decision of the
EEC in the Grundig case shows that,
[I]n the field of vertical restraints one of the most important restrictions on com-
petition, the territorial division of markets, will to the extent that it constitutes
a division beween one nation market of an E.E.C. country, from the market of
another E.E.C. country, be prohibited in almost every case and that dispensation
under [article] 85(3) will be very difficult if not impossible to obtain. 36
Because of this opinion it is felt that the Grundig decision was inconsistent
with avowed EEC policies since "the Commission . . . enjoined the entire
arrangement rather than prohibiting a particular practice. 37 However, once
the arrangement as a whole was found to adversely affect the market, there
was no reason why the Commission should not then strike it down. In ac-
cordance with their dual tradition the question which must be posed is simply
whether or not the arrangement results in an adverse effect, and not, how
much of the arrangement results in an adverse effect.
Despite ambiguities which may exist, the Grundig decision still demon-
strates two major points. First, there is an "assertion by the Commission of
the supremacy of the Community antitrust rules over the national laws of
the Member States."38 "This is a further step toward a European State,
and . . . an increasing emphasis on 'Europe first, nation second.' "9 This
assertion by the EEC and submission by the member countries cannot be
minimized. The activities complained of occurred mainly in France, albeit
between a French and German company. Yet, the French courts were dis-
posed to submit the controversy to an international body for determination,
rather than adjudicate it themselves. As was conjectured by one writer be-
fore the Grundig decision, "entry into the Community is akin to State
Succession."' 40 The decision supports this premise.
There have been few, if any, instances in history when a sovereign nation
has willingly allowed internal economic matters to be determined by another
35 Bassiouni, supra note 22.
36 Newes, The European Commission's First Major Antitrust Decision, 20 Bus. LAW.
431, 436 (1965).
37 Weiser, Patent and Antitrust Developments in the European Economic Community,
10 IDEA 1 (1966).
38 Supra note 36, at 439.
39 Comment, The External Tariff oj the European Economic Community: The Com-
mission and Supranationalism, 5 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 228 (1965).
40 O'CONNELL, INTERNATiONAL LAW 294 (1965).
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body politic. Yet, the Treaty of Rome has accomplished just this and so,
represents a modification of its members' economic sovereignty. 41 If a country
today can willingly forfeit jurisdiction in an important internal matter for
the good of a larger community, then perhaps we are progressing towards a
time when countries will submit grievances to an international body for the
good of the world community. This submission came not from force, but
from a desire to maintain economic harmony among the member states.
A second observation on the Grundig decision is that the EEC has, in fact,
upheld its principles. The Grundig-Consten arrangement clearly created a
monopoly. Yet, the Commission did not, as a matter of course, state that it
must be repressed. Rather, the Commission examined the arrangement in
light of the provisions of article 85 prohibiting associations "which affect
adversely trade between the Member States. '42 Only after it was determined
that there was an adverse effect and consequently no benefit to the consumer
from the arrangement, did the Commission nullify the agreement. The Com-
mission also indicated that the dispensation provisions of subsection three
of article 85 were not moot factors, but would be considered in every case
coming before it.
Those who felt that, because of Grundig "dispensation under [article] 85
(3) will be very difficult if not impossible to obtain," 43 and that the Treaty of
Rome carefully avoided leaving any opportunity for trusts to be formed,44
seem to have interpreted a European antitrust decision as if pronounced by
an American tribunal. Were this the case, the framers of the Treaty would
have done better to have entirely left out any reference to dispensation from
the antitrust provisions. More likely, such provisions were intentionally in-
cluded to allow for those situations where monopolies would not adversely
affect the market.
In Grundig, the monopoly did have an adverse affect on the market and
the Commission had no alternative but to repress it. However, the concept
that "bigness" is inevitably detrimental to the public is an American and
not an European one. Monopolies, as some European cartels of the past, may
be beneficial to the public. In such a case, the Commission will no doubt
uphold their existence.
Melvin Rishe*
41 Id.
42 LANC, supra note 1, at 504.
43 Supra note 36, at 431.
44 Bassiouni, supra note 22.
* Mr. Rishe is a Former Editor-in-Chief of the DE PAUL LAW REVIEW.
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